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Economists’ Statement on U.S. Broadband Policy 
 
Broadband, or high-speed access to the Internet, has generated significant economic 
benefits.  Certain regulations, however, are slowing investment and deterring entry into 
the broadband market.  In this statement, we make the following two recommendations 
that would remedy these regulatory defects and thereby lower artificial barriers to 
competitive provision of broadband services: 
 
Recommendation 1: Congress should eliminate local franchising regulations, 
which serve as a barrier to new entry. 
 
Recommendation 2: Congress and the Federal Communications Commission 
should make more spectrum available to private parties and allow them to use it 
or trade the right to use it, so that spectrum will go to its highest-valued uses. 
 
The bottom line is that investment in broadband should be as easy as possible.   





Some firms that want to provide broadband services currently must obtain local approval 
and access to rights of way, pay fees, and meet regulatory obligations regarding service 
provision.  These obstacles can slow investment and deter entry. 
 
For example, if a firm wants to provide video services over broadband lines it must 
negotiate with every franchising authority in its coverage area.  The FCC (1997) has 
noted that approximately 33,000 municipalities in the U.S. have the authority to issue 
franchise licenses.  Dealing with every city separately is slow and costly, and discourages 
competitive entry.  Such delay can reduce consumer welfare.  Research by the 
Government Accountability Office suggests that telecommunications service prices were 
15 to 41 percent lower in cities with the new entrants than in cities without (GAO 2004), 
and that cable prices were about 15 percent lower in cities with wireline video 
competition (GAO 2005).  
 
What might a better regulatory environment look like?  It would not be totally bereft of 
regulation, but it should not include franchising or other rules that do little more than 
block or delay entry. 
 
Congress should preempt local and state governments from requiring providers to obtain 
local franchises to offer new services.  There is no economic rationale for allowing cities 
to control who can provide broadband or related services. 
 
At the same time, however, Congress should recognize that many municipalities rely on 
franchise fees, but it should insist that fees be non-discriminatory.  Ideally, any fees 
would reflect costs imposed by firms on the city.   2
Spectrum allocation 
 
High-speed Internet connections can also be provided using wireless networks. Much of 
the potentially most valuable spectrum, however, is not available for its most productive 
uses (Kwerel and Williams 2002).  The FCC should make additional licensed spectrum 
available for flexible use as soon as possible and allow it to be traded so that spectrum 
can be allocated to its highest-valued uses. 
 
Removing the existing artificial scarcities could lead to improved competition not only 
among conventional wireless services, but also to the creation of new services, including 




We have offered two recommendations for removing artificial regulatory barriers to the 
operation of an efficient market for broadband services.  The first recommendation aims 
to reduce local regulatory burdens that arbitrarily restrict broadband entry and 
investment.  The second recommendation aims to change federal policy so as to reduce 
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